Some Observations About the Turn Toward Federal Rulemaking in Health Law by Griesbach, John M.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 49 
Number 1 Administrative Law Meets Health 
Law: Inextricable Pairing or Marriage of 
Convenience? (Fall 2004) 
Article 9 
12-1-2004 
Some Observations About the Turn Toward Federal Rulemaking in 
Health Law 
John M. Griesbach 
Saint Louis University School of Law, john.griesbach@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John M. Griesbach, Some Observations About the Turn Toward Federal Rulemaking in Health Law, 49 St. 
Louis U. L.J. (2004). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol49/iss1/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
141 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE TURN TOWARD FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING IN HEALTH LAW 
JOHN M. GRIESBACH* 
The law respecting the provision and financing of health care and what we 
understand to be administrative law, as Professor Jost reminds us,1 have long 
been intertwined.  Moreover, given the many highly diverse activities involved 
in health care, Professor Jost is no doubt correct to point out that 
considerations of institutional competence go a good distance in explaining 
why much of health law has been administrative law.2  One need only 
deliberate a bit about the problems raised by the screening of new drugs and 
medical devices for commercial distribution to appreciate the need for an 
agency like the FDA that can give continuous single-minded attention to safety 
and efficacy considerations, that has a professional staff which can develop 
and deploy scientific and technical expertise, and that is relatively independent 
of other institutions and so can make consistent and coordinated decisions.3  
Likewise, by calling to mind the complexities involved and the practical 
experience needed to accredit hospitals and other medical facilities or to 
oversee payment and underwriting practices of health insurers, it is not 
difficult to understand why the states have turned to specialized agencies as 
front-line decision makers.  Moreover, while Professor Jost tells us that health 
law and administrative law are “intertwined,” he also speaks of “the 
dominance of administrative law in health care,” and he predicts that 
“administrative law may increase rather than decrease, as we continue to 
struggle to expand access to health care, reduce its cost, and improve its 
quality.”4  I want to emphasize and to expand on these latter, stronger 
sentiments.  In particular, I want to suggest that the emergence of health law as 
a distinguishable, more or less coherent body of law is best seen through the 
lens of administrative law, and secondly, I want to call attention to some 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. 
 1. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most 
Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2004) (describing the roles administrative agencies play in 
overseeing the delivery and finance of health care). 
 2. Id. at 16. 
 3. See generally, Eric Claeys, The Food And Drug Administration and the Command-and-
Control Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 105 (2004). 
 4. Jost, supra note 1, at 33. 
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fundamental changes in administrative law over the past quarter century that 
are critical to understanding the shape and content of health law today. 
I.  THE TURN TOWARD FEDERAL RULEMAKING AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
HEALTH LAW 
At the beginning of his paper, Professor Jost makes the important 
observation that it was not until the mid-1960s that health law began to emerge 
as a single body of law and policy.5  The law dealing with health care until that 
time is best seen as a collection of more or less formal adjudicatory systems, 
many operating at the state level, and each meant to deal with a quite different 
kind of problem.  Think of the several systems of common law adjudication, 
such as medical malpractice law’s enquiries into responsibility for medical 
maloccurrences and contract law’s adjudication of health insurance disputes.  
Think also of the various adjudicative systems operated by state administrative 
agencies, such as the boards charged with licensing and disciplining medical 
practitioners and with overseeing the rates and claims practices of health 
insurers.  Consider the widespread reliance on the case-by-case hospital 
accreditation programs operated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO).6  Finally, call to mind the case-by-case 
decision making of federal agencies, such as the FDA’s screening of new drugs 
and medical devices, the NLRB’s adjudication of unfair labor practice cases 
involving hospitals, the FTC’s policing of fraud and other “unfair methods of 
competition,” and the antitrust activities of the DOJ in the federal courts.  
Standing back a bit, one cannot help but notice two striking features about this 
pre-health law era.  First, each of these systems operated by making case-by-
case decisions that carried out a general though vague standard or directive.  
State medical malpractice law, for example, consisted of specialized rules and 
practices in accordance with which juries determined whether maloccurrences 
were caused by “medical negligence.”  Similarly, the FDA was directed to 
approve the marketing of a new drug or medical device only if it was 
determined to be “safe” and “effective.”7  Of equal importance, each of these 
various adjudicative systems operated almost wholly independent of the others.  
In medical malpractice cases, for example, evidence of a defendant’s failure to 
be board-certified in a specialty was held to be inadmissible or merely some 
 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. For a general description of the JCAHO’s status and activities, see BARRY R. FURROW 
ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 136–140 (3d ed. 1997). 
 7. Though operating through case-by-case decision making, each system exhibited a 
measure of coherence and accommodated development and change by elaborating its basic 
standard or directive in written opinions, issuing rules of practice and procedure, and developing 
analogical precedent. 
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evidence bearing on the question of whether he or she had been negligent.8  As 
another example, the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945 and the state action 
doctrine largely insulated state oversight of health insurance rates from 
perspectives and policies advanced by the FTC and by the Antitrust Division 
of the DOJ.9  Looking back, it is entirely natural to understand this as a pre-
health law era: Medical malpractice law was best seen as part of tort law, 
health insurance law as part of insurance law, physician licensure as part of 
state regulation of businesses and professions “impressed with the public 
interest,” and the FDA screening process as part of food and drug law.  There 
were many parts of law that had to do with the provision and financing of 
health care, but very little of it could be seen as tying these bits and pieces 
together. 
Now, as Professor Jost emphasizes throughout his paper, the emergence 
and growth of health law as a coherent body of law and policy happens to 
coincide with the creation at the federal level of a whole series of 
statutory/regulatory structures that operate primarily through prospectively 
applicable rules.10  He mentions the many statutes enacted since the 1960s that 
established rulemaking as the favored form of lawmaking by health and safety 
agencies.11  The Medicare and Medicaid programs, created in 1965, augured in 
the change, giving rise to the promulgation of rules respecting, inter alia, 
coverage and payment, certification of facilities and providers, peer review, 
fraud and abuse, including false claims and kickback prohibitions.12  
Moreover, it was by way of the rulemaking process that Medicare was 
transformed in the 1980s from a cost-and-charge payment system into the 
administered system of DRG’s for hospital reimbursement and the RBRVS-
based physician payment program.  Enactment of ERISA and of the National 
Health Resources Planning and Development Act in 1974 continued the trend 
that had begun a decade earlier by calling for the promulgation of a host of 
rules respecting employer-funded health insurance and state certification of 
need programs.13  And appearing as a noteworthy countertrend in the era of 
deregulation, important new statutory/regulatory programs were initiated in the 
1980s: 
 
 8. See, e.g., Turek v. Saint Elizabeth Cmty. Health Ctr., 488 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Neb. 1992); 
Leahy v. Kenosha Mem’l Hosp., 348 N.W.2d 607, 613 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984); Fjerstad v. 
Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8, 14 (S.D. 1978); Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 497 P.2d 1354, 1357 (Haw. 1972). 
 9. For a general discussion of the operation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Charles D. 
Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History 
and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587 (1978). 
 10. See Jost, supra note 1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. For a general description of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, see FURROW ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 523–68. 
 13. Employee Retirement Investment Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
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 the enactment of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)14 in 1984, 
requiring the Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate 
rules establishing  an Organ Procurement Transplant Network for the 
retrieval, distribution and transplantation of human organs; 
 the passage of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA)15 in 1986, giving rise to the promulgation of emergency 
room stabilization and active labor rules for Medicare providers; 
 the passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act16 in 1986, 
generating rules respecting hospitals’ limited immunity for staff 
privilege decisions and governing the establishment and use of the 
National Practitioner Data Bank; 
 the enactment in 1987 of the statutory predicate17 for extensive federal 
regulation of nursing homes; and 
 the passage of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act (Stark I)18 in 1989, 
requiring the promulgation of rules prohibiting physicians from making 
certain self-interested referrals of Medicare patients.19 
Though the pace of statutory change was dealt a blow with the collapse of the 
Clinton health insurance initiative in 1994, Stark II,20 enacted as part of the 
1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,21 generated more rounds of detailed 
regulations implementing the statute’s complex treatment of self-referrals.  
 
 14. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2000)) (as 
amended by the Transplant Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-616, 104 Stat. 3279, and 
by the Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 
584). 
 15. Enacted as part of the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 164 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000)). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–11115 (2000)). 
 17. Enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (2000)). 
 18. Enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, 103 Stat. 2236 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000)). 
 19. This is only a partial listing of the explosive increase in federal statutory/regulatory 
regimes created during the 1980s.  Consider also that, as part of TERRA of 1980, HHS was 
required to promulgate rules permitting HMO’s to provide services to Medicare beneficiaries on 
either a risk or capitation basis.  And, as another example, the Health Omnibus Programs 
Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3048, which includes the following titles: the 
National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders and Health Research 
Extension Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3048, the Organ Transplant Amendments 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3114, the Health Professions Reauthorization Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3122, and the Nursing Shortage Reduction and Education 
Extension Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3153. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 596 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn). 
 21. 107 Stat. at 312. 
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Additionally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA)22 has given rise to the promulgation of a host of rules dealing with, 
inter alia, pre-existing conditions limitations in health insurance plans, 
discrimination against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health 
status, small group insurance markets and small employer coverage, creation 
of insurance pools for high-risk individuals, medical savings accounts, tax 
incentives to encourage purchase of long-term care insurance, and a series of 
new federal health-care criminal offenses.  And as recently as last year, 
Congress and the President enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,23 directing HHS to promulgate 
rules setting up complex temporary, and then permanent, programs through 
which Medicare beneficiaries can purchase prescription drugs at reduced prices 
and at public expense, and still more rules establishing a framework for 
creating medical savings accounts. 
Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that alongside the creation of 
these new statutory/regulatory programs, many of the traditional legal 
structures in the health-care arena have been transformed by the addition of 
rulemaking powers or by the promulgation of federal rules that limit, 
condition, and circumscribe their operations.  Professor Claeys describes the 
process by which statutory amendments to its enabling act in the 1960s and 
Peter Hutt’s “legal entrepreneurship” in the 1970s shifted the FDA toward 
command-and-control style regulation.24  In like fashion, the FTC asserted 
substantive rulemaking powers in the early 1970s25 and was later statutorily 
authorized to promulgate rules that specified acts or practices as “unfair or 
deceptive.”26  Finally, and very importantly, Professor Jost mentions how the 
activities of “private entities” such as Medicare contractors, “qualified review 
organizations,” and IRB’s are directed and constrained by rules promulgated 
by federal administrative actors.27 
Now, it seems to me that one cannot exaggerate the significance of this 
move toward rulemaking as the preferred mode for fashioning health law and 
policy.28  It is widely thought, as Professor Jost notes, that rulemaking was 
 
 22. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 24. See Claeys, supra note 3. 
 25. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ratifying 
FTC’s substantive rule-making powers). 
 26. Federal Trade Commission Improvement (Magnuson-Moss) Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 
57a(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 27. Jost, supra note 1, at 5. 
 28. Like Professor Jost, by “rulemaking,” I refer not only to the “informal” notice-and-
comment process of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557 (2000), but 
also to what I sometimes call “informal, informal rulemaking,” the process that yields the 
plethora of “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure or practice” that are excepted from notice-and-comment requirements by § 553(b)(A) 
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adopted in the 1960s and 1970s as an alternative to the formal trial-type 
processes of the New Deal and earlier “independent” agencies, which were 
seen to have been “captured” by regulated interests.  It was not so much that 
agencies were thought to have been stuffed with ideologues of the right or of 
the left (which we might worry about today) or even that there was a 
“revolving door” between agencies and those they regulated (which we 
certainly worry about today).  Rather, “capture” of the independent agencies by 
regulated interests was seen as a structural consequence of the formal trial-type 
processes themselves.29  The adjudicative processes of the traditional agencies 
proceeded by way of expensive, time and resource intensive, case-by-case 
trials with relatively independent administrative law judges, designated parties, 
pleadings, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, formal records, 
burdens of proof, detailed findings of fact and precisely formulated decisions 
of law, intra-agency review, Article III judicial review, and stays pending 
review.30  These features, given the vagaries of agency caseloads, made it very 
difficult for the agencies to develop consistent and coordinated policies, much 
less to alter their policies in response to changed circumstances or priorities.  
Moreover, because regulated interests were willing and able to use all manner 
of procedural devices to delay and frustrate the resolution of individual cases, 
the agencies tended to “compromise” with and to “accommodate” those whom 
they regulated as the price for getting anything done.  Grudging and 
incremental change was the best that could be expected.  “Capture”—a pattern 
of decisions protective of the existing regulated interests—was thought to be 
the more common outcome.  And so the ICC was “captured” by the railroads 
and later also by the truckers; the FPC was “captured” by the gas producers 
and the pipelines, the FCC by the broadcasters and licensees, and the CAB by 
the airlines, with no failures and no new entrants for decades. 
Given this picture of the adjudicative process, the empowering of agencies 
to engage in rulemaking was understood to be a much needed reform.  With 
rulemaking, agencies could act on a wholesale basis, quickly and efficiently 
generating decisions that applied prospectively to large classes of cases.  
Rather than depending on the happenstance of litigation to raise important 
issues, agency heads and policy-makers could set their rulemaking agendas, 
fashion and coordinate the promulgation of inter-related rules to deal with 
 
and the rules issued upon agency “good cause” findings that notice-and-comment procedures “are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” under §553(b)(B).  See 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b) (2000). 
 29. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION (1955).  For the classic “capture” critique of independent agencies from the 
political left, see GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877–1916 (1965). 
 30. For the federal APA’s requirements for formal adjudication, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557 
(2000).  For the procedures for formal rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556–557 (2000). 
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complex problems, and modify and even reverse policies as conditions and 
priorities changed.  And while the APA generally provided that any and all 
interested parties could get involved in the rulemaking process and that 
agencies must explain their decisions, participation was ordinarily by way of 
written comments only and, rather than setting out detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, justification of rules commonly took the form of policy 
focused analyses of problems and information bearing upon them.31  
Moreover, the rulemaking process included few procedural devices with which 
to delay or frustrate agency actions.  It lacked the many detailed subordinate 
decisions that might give rise to intra-agency and judicial review.  In short, by 
the mid-1960s, it was widely thought that agencies’ use of rulemaking could 
wrest the policy-making initiative from those whom they regulated.32 
Also, as Professor Jost notes, a complimentary, decidedly positive theory 
of rulemaking had become ascendant by the mid-1960s.  In the spirit of 
Kennedy era idealism and the ambition of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society,” 
there was widespread confidence that government could, and often did, act in 
ways that advanced “the public interest.”  Socio-economic life was taken to be 
complex, with a great many groups having interests that, while often diverging 
and clashing, were all nonetheless “legitimate” in some measure.  The 
challenge and the task of government on matters of importance was to get all 
affected interests represented and to engage in decision-making processes that 
could be expected to “balance” or at least to effect compromises among the 
interests of the affected social and economic groups.  Given this understanding, 
the privileged form of lawmaking was, of course, the statutory enactment.  
With identical language approved by a majority of each of two quite different 
representative bodies and by the President, who represented the broadest of all 
electorates, the statute was understood to literally embody the outcome of the 
“interest balancing” process.33  Indeed, not the New Deal era, but the period 
from the mid-1960s through the late 1970s has been reckoned to have been the 
golden age of statutes.34  Large and important areas of social and economic 
 
 31. For informal rulemaking, the APA merely requires agencies to give interested persons 
the opportunity to submit data, views, and arguments in writing and to “incorporate in the rules 
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose,” though it permits the agency at 
its discretion to provide for oral testimony.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). 
 32. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the 
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965). 
 33. The privileging of statutory enactment during the 1960s and 1970s is put in relief by two 
other characteristics of this “legal process” era of legal thought: 1) its understanding of common 
law adjudication as an attempt to cognitively mimic the legislative process through a self-
conscious “interest balancing” calculus and 2) the efforts to resolve “the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty” of constitutional review of statutes.  See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 34. See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979) (expressing strong dissatisfaction with the measure of 
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life—ranging from our treatment of air and water and wildlife resources to our 
imposition of health and safety risks on workers and consumers, from our 
responses to workplace discrimination and the difficulties of the handicapped 
to our treatment of the medical problems of the aged and the poor35—were 
brought under the influence, control, and structuring of government. 
In contrast to most statutes of earlier periods, those enacted after the mid-
1960s tended to be long and detailed.36  In part, no doubt, this striking feature 
of modern statutes is a straightforward consequence of the attempt to describe 
and to fashion a single structure of interlocking goals and processes out of 
many diverging and often conflicting interests.  For reasons both practical and 
theoretical, however, these long, detailed statutes ordinarily set out only the 
main features and skeletal shapes of their statutory/regulatory structures, 
delegating the powers and responsibilities of elaboration and implementation 
to administrative agencies.  Indeed, the very complexity of design of these 
statutes and their linguistic richness multiply the uncertainties and ambiguities 
that call for clarification.  And, as we have seen in the health-care area, modern 
statutes almost invariably call upon agencies to fill in the details through 
rulemaking.  In the 1960s and 1970s, they did so in furtherance of the same 
“interest accommodating” objectives that inspired the passage of the enabling 
acts in the first place.  The rulemaking contemplated by these statutes was 
informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking.  It was expected that, upon 
notification of a proposed rule bearing upon matters of concern, interested 
parties would submit their views by way of written comments, thereby 
educating agency officials of the various interests and of how those interests 
related to one another.  Agency officials, after giving “adequate consideration” 
to all affected interest, would attempt to fashion generally acceptable 
compromises, which would then be explained and justified in the course of the 
statements of “basis and purpose” required by the APA.  Thus, notice-and-
comment rulemaking was promoted not merely as a way for agencies to escape 
the incremental, piecemeal, often futile adjudicative processes of the 
“independent agencies,” but also as a powerful vehicle by which they could 
elaborate and implement the new statutory/regulatory initiatives in an open, 
theoretically sound, and legitimate manner.37 
 
discretion delegated to administrative actors and arguing for a resurrection of the non-delegation 
doctrine). 
 35. For a partial summary of statutory/regulatory systems established in the 1960s and 
1970s, see id. at 55–56. 
 36. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 821–45 (detailing trend to greater 
statutory specificity through the 1970s). 
 37. For the classic articulation of this “interest representation” model of rulemaking, see 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 
(1975).  Of course, mindful also of agency “capture,” Stewart strongly endorsed the development 
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Now, plainly, in the course of the past quarter century, these historical 
bases for the turn toward rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s have been 
thoroughly undermined.  Kennedy era idealism has been displaced by the 
cynicism toward government advanced by the law and economics and public 
choice movements of the 1980s and 1990s.  Sentiments behind Johnson’s 
Great Society initiative have been recast as the ineluctable drive of big 
government to grow even bigger.  Rather than waxing about “the public 
interest” and about the civic virtues of government officials, we are more likely 
to see special interests, self-protective bureaucrats, and the ideologically driven 
ambition of political appointees.  We have become disparaging of the 
legislative process, alternating between consternation over its inability to get 
anything done and disgust over its use to pad the pockets of the connected, 
nurture moral hazard, and impose economic rents.38  Indeed, one cannot have 
lived through the past two decades without becoming vividly aware that it is 
now the discipline of the market—and not the legislative process—that is taken 
as our privileged mode of regulation. 
This fundamental shift in our paradigm of regulation is manifest in many 
ways.  It can be seen, for example, in the continuous clamor to reduce taxes 
and to downsize government by starving it of resources.  It can also be seen in 
the regulatory use of market mechanisms and in the deployment of cost-benefit 
analysis as an attempt to mimic the workings of markets.39  But its most 
obvious manifestation has been the serial deregulation of industry after 
industry—railroads, trucking, airlines, natural gas production, package 
delivery, long distance and then local telecommunications, cable television, 
banking, etc.—beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through the 1990s.  
Indeed, as noted by Professor Jost40 and described in more detail by Professor 
Gilhooley,41 there has even been a modest deregulation in the health-care area. 
It is important to note, however, that the industries that have been 
deregulated, with few exceptions, are those that had been put under the 
jurisdiction of the “independent agencies” of the New Deal era and earlier, 
e.g., the ICC, the CAB, the FCC, where the dominant mode of regulation had 
 
of “hard look” review to enable courts to ensure that agencies give adequate consideration to all 
affected interests.  Id. at 1758 n.426. 
 38. For a general discussion of this pessimism about government during what he calls “The 
Public Choice Era” after 1983, see Merrill, supra note 29, at 1053–55. 
 39. For an analysis of the “interest group maneuvering” undermining the EPA’s “command 
and control” air pollution regulation with an argument for the adoption of economic incentives in 
its stead, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).  
For an extended economic analysis of methods of regulation, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE 
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997). 
 40. See Jost, supra note 1, at 13 (noting repeal of the National Health Resources Planning 
and Development Act of 1974). 
 41. See Margaret Gilhooley, FDA and the Adaptation of Regulatory Models, 49 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 131 (2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
150 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:141 
been formal and adjudicative in nature.  Strikingly, those industries and 
activities subjected to regulation under the rulemaking regimes put in place 
during the 1960s and 1970s have generally not been deregulated.  In fact, most 
statutes enacted during the 1980s and 1990s tend to increase the power of 
agencies to promulgate rules respecting such industries and activities.42  This is 
especially the case with the regulation of health care.  Not only have the 
statutory/regulatory structures put in place by the Medicare and Medicaid 
statutes and by ERISA not been dismantled, but new enactments during the 
1980s (and later, as we have seen) have greatly increased the scope and reach 
of federal rulemaking.  And that, in turn, raises several questions.  What is 
there, we might ask, about the provision and financing of health care that 
distinguishes it from those industries and activities that have been deregulated?  
What is there about the regulation of health care that trumps our overall 
skepticism about government?  And what connection is there between those 
considerations and our use of rulemaking as the dominant mode of regulating? 
Professor Jost, I believe, has given us the answers to these questions.  He 
tells us that the topic of our concern is “our largest industry, encompassing 
one-seventh of our economy, and intimately affecting each of our lives on a 
regular basis—occasionally literally in matters of life and death.”43  He also 
tells us that this topic of concern involves “the relationships among health-care 
providers, professionals, patients, and the government with respect to the 
organization, provision, and financing of health care.”44  These are matters of 
great importance, but even more obviously they are matters of great 
complexity.  Indeed, in the course of his paper, Professor Jost mentions just a 
few of the tasks involved in the regulation of health care in contemporary 
America: 
 licensing and certifying medical providers and medical facilities, 
 making staff privilege decisions, 
 protecting against medical malpractice, 
 licensing the sale and use of new drugs and medical devices, 
 overseeing research involving human subjects, 
 safeguarding the privacy of medical information, 
 overseeing nursing homes, 
 subsidizing and overseeing employer-provided health benefit plans, 
 
 42. See, e.g., the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 808, 312, 
104 Stat. 2399, 2690–92 (1990) (directing the EPA, inter alia, to promulgate rules creating an 
emission trading system for power plants). 
 43. See Jost, supra note 1, at 2. 
 44. Id. 
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 subsidizing and overseeing “charitable” medical institutions, 
 spending hundreds of billions of dollars of Medicare and Medicaid 
funds, 
 establishing coverage and payment practices rules for Medicare and 
Medicaid, 
 policing against fraud and abuse, 
 overseeing private insurance underwriting practices and coverage 
decisions, 
 expanding access to insurance, 
 ensuring emergency room screening and stabilization, 
 providing some form of public insurance for the indigent, 
 moving toward universal access.45 
Now, one need but skim a list like this to see that what is being regulated is 
an industry in only the loosest sense of the term.  In the first place, it is a whole 
sector of the economy that is regulated here, like the transportation sector or 
the agricultural sector, with no substitutes for accomplishing its ends.  
Secondly, because many components of the provision and financing of health 
care bear upon and are interrelated with one another, sometimes establishing 
background conditions for the operation of other components,46 other times 
acting as functional substitutes for one another,47 different parts of health law 
cannot easily be addressed, much less changed, in isolation and independently 
of others.  Thirdly, with health-care providers and facilities and its financing 
cutting across the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors, its regulation 
necessarily has important ramifications on the domestic and global 
competitiveness of American businesses, on national and intergenerational 
income and wealth distribution, on federalism, and on our allocations of power 
among public and private actors.  Finally, and most importantly, because 
health care is situated at the very center of our lives, literally from the cradle to 
the grave, it has come to be as critical to personal security as police protection, 
and the manner in which health care is distributed causes us to examine just 
what we are as human beings. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Consider, for example, the huge national network of hospitals that are financially 
dependent on Medicare functions as a background condition for the application of EMTALA 
obligations. 
 47. One obvious example is the pervasive use of drug therapy as a functional substitute for 
all manner of invasive interventions. 
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Given such complexity, Professor Jost is surely on solid ground to argue 
that regulation that relies only on stand-alone statutes, state courts, private 
ordering and markets, and the culture of professionalism is just not up to the 
job.48  He concludes, almost by way of a process of elimination, that the union 
of health law with administrative law is here to stay.49  But I think we must 
claim much more.  It is not merely that various administrative law mechanisms 
match up well with some of the tasks given to health law, but, given the 
enormous importance of health care in contemporary life, the daunting 
challenges posed by its provision and financing, and the high stakes, we have 
had no choice, it seems to me, other than to deploy a particular form of 
administrative law, one that is dominated by federal rulemaking.  It is only by 
way of statutory/regulatory structures elaborated and implemented through 
rulemaking that we have been able to regulate these various components of 
health care with sufficient information and at the level of detail necessary to 
address the trade-offs, the substitution effects, the inter-connectedness of 
different activities, the effects on wealth and income distributions, on 
competitiveness, on federalism, and so on, and to do this in a way that is 
sufficiently flexible to enable us to adapt our policies as underlying conditions 
and priorities change.  Accordingly, I want to suggest that the rise of federal 
rulemaking and the emergence of health law as a distinguishable, more or less 
coherent body of law are not merely coincident.  Indeed, I suggest that the 
connection between the two is causal, that it is largely by virtue of the 
operation of the administrative rulemaking process over the past quarter 
century that there exists a body of law that we know as health law. 
II.  THE CONCENTRATION OF RULEMAKING POWERS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
It is to administrative agencies and their top officials, of course, that the 
many statutes enacted since the mid-1960s delegate the task of promulgating 
rules.  But an administrative agency does not operate in a legal vacuum.  It 
always operates within a framework of actions and influences and powers that 
might be exercised by the White House, Congress, and the federal courts.  
Agency heads and their senior subordinates are appointed by the President with 
approval by the Senate, and most agency officials with rulemaking 
responsibilities can be dismissed by the President for any reason.50  Agency 
budgets must be channeled through the White House, and the White House has 
 
 48. Jost, supra note 1, at 30. 
 49. However, it seems to be an unhappy marriage, given his concluding recommendation for 
counseling.  See id. at 33. 
 50. For the now classic trilogy of cases disabling Congress from limiting the President’s 
power to dismiss officials charged with the performance of “executive functions” but restricting 
Presidential removal of those with “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” functions, see Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); 
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
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long exercised some influence over agencies’ rules and rulemaking agendas.  
Congress, of course, conditions and qualifies agency rulemaking with all 
manner of statutory detail in an agency’s enabling act.  And it must always be 
kept in mind that Congress (together with the President) retains the power to 
amend an agency’s enabling act and so is in a position to reject what the 
agency has set out to do or to mandate what it has refrained from doing.  In 
addition to the Senate’s role in the appointment of “high officers,” Congress 
can in some measure influence an agency’s rules and its rulemaking agenda by 
interjecting line item specifications in appropriations statutes and through the 
oversight and investigative hearings of its committees.  Finally, it should be 
kept in mind that enabling acts setting out the terms and conditions for the 
exercise of agency rulemaking powers will ordinarily also provide for judicial 
review of the performance of those duties.  And where the statute is silent, the 
APA’s directives for judicial review are generally applicable.51  Agencies 
promulgate their rules in reaction to, and often in anticipation of, decisions 
made by the reviewing courts.  In light of this institutional complexity, the first 
lesson to be drawn from the study of administrative law is that agency 
lawmaking is always a matter of shared powers.  This is as much the case with 
agency lawmaking through the fashioning and promulgating of rules as it is 
with agency lawmaking by adjudicating.  But the next and more difficult 
lesson is that the relative measure of lawmaking powers exercised by the 
agencies, the White House, Congress, and the federal courts varies enormously 
from agency to agency, from context to context, and over time. 
Indeed, during the first several decades of the rulemaking era, the lower 
federal courts and Congress developed and made extensive use of a variety of 
powerful ways to influence and control the rulemaking process.  The judiciary 
exerted its influence primarily through what has become known as “hard look” 
review and by non-deferentially deploying traditional tools of statutory 
construction on many vague and ambiguous provisions of the statutes under 
which the agencies operated.  “Hard look” review developed in the late 1960s 
and 1970s into an extraordinarily flexible technique by which a reviewing 
court could thoroughly scrutinize an agency action, yet deftly avoid displacing 
the agency from its position as front-line actor.52  It typically played out in 
three stages: First, the reviewing court nondeferentially identified statutorily 
required factors and considerations that the agency must take into account and 
 
 51. With the removal of the amount in controversy requirement for suits against the 
government, the general federal question jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), nearly 
always empowers the district courts to entertain challenges to agency rules, and the APA, 5 
U.S.C. § 701 (2000), provides that reviewing courts will take up any legal challenges to agency 
actions except where review is precluded by statute or the “action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.” 
 52. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls 
over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992). 
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procedures that the agency must follow prior to taking action.  Second, the 
reviewing court put a high burden of justification on the agency by taking “a 
hard look” at whether the agency in fact acted in ways that satisfied the 
specified statutory requirements.  Finally, in the event that the agency was not 
able to convince the court that it had adequately taken those factors or 
considerations into account or that it had followed the required procedures, the 
reviewing court declared that it was unable to conclude that the action survived 
the “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion” standard of review, and that it 
therefore had no option but to remand the matter back to the agency for 
another try.53  Carrying the imprimatur of the Supreme Court after the Overton 
Park54 decision in 1971, “hard look” review effectively transformed the 
“arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion” standard from an extraordinarily 
deferential test that was rarely used to prohibit an agency’s exercise of 
discretion from reaching a specific outcome55 into a procedurally focused 
method by which the lower courts could thoroughly involve themselves in the 
discretionary decisions of agencies while avoiding, thanks to the remand 
remedy, the ultimate responsibility for the outcomes of those decisions.  The 
utility of “hard look” review was greatly increased with the Supreme Court’s 
dramatic lowering of hurdles posed by traditional standing, ripeness, and 
reviewability doctrines,56 and the method was available regardless of what 
process the agency used in coming to its decision.57  But “hard look” review 
was especially powerful where the decision under review resulted from an 
agency’s use of informal rulemaking procedures.  For one thing, the notice-
and-comment process enabled those objecting to an agency’s proposed rule to 
submit data, studies, challenges to methodologies, additional factors, 
 
 53. In its essentials, “hard look” review was an elaboration of the older Chenery doctrine 
that a reviewing court will demand that the agency itself articulate the justifying basis for its 
decision.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 54. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 55. For an example of the deferential stance of the traditional “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of 
discretion” standard, see Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 
290 (1974) (upholding a licensing decision of the ICC because “we can discern in the 
Commission’s opinion a rational basis for its treatment of the evidence, and the ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ test does not require more”). 
 56. On the liberalization of the standing doctrine during this time, see, e.g., Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970) (replacing “legally protected 
interest” test with requirement that challengers of agency action show “injury in fact” and an 
interest “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected” by law); on liberalization of 
ripeness doctrine, see, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (authorizing pre-
enforcement review of FDA rules respecting prescription drug labels and advertisements); on 
expansive reviewability, see id. at 140–141 (construing the APA to establish a presumption of 
reviewability of agency rules).  For a sense of the period’s general endorsement of active judicial 
review, see Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 
(1970). 
 57. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (1985). 
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countervailing considerations, and so on, thereby presenting the reviewing 
court with a large paper record that could structure and inform its “hard look.”  
For another thing, its “concise general statement of basis and purpose” 
provision was judicially developed into a requirement that agencies include 
extended justificatory statements in the federal register notices of their final 
rules, and those decision documents could then be mined by challengers and 
reviewing courts alike in their search for indications that agencies failed to 
adequately consider all those factors and only those factors that the statute 
required them to consider or that they failed to follow the processes required 
by statute.58 
As we have seen, “hard look” review commonly involved non-deferential 
statutory construction in its first step.  But this should not be considered a 
departure from general judicial practices of the late 1960s and the 1970s.  The 
detailed regulatory statutes of the rulemaking era supplied countless occasions 
for non-deferential judicial review, and the prevailing legal philosophy ensured 
that the judiciary was ready and willing to partake.  As already mentioned, the 
legal process school understood lawmaking to be fundamentally a matter of 
compromising and coordinating among numerous interests, and it viewed the 
legislative process as the paradigmatic interest-balancing mechanism.  Duly 
enacted statutes were understood to establish legislative ends—the goals and 
objectives of governmental action—and to outline at least some of the means 
for realizing those ends.  Statutory ends, some of which might be specified in 
the statute’s preamble and others known by implication, were almost always 
multiple.  Some were understood to be primary, while others secondary and 
subordinate.  Because novel and unexpected problems inevitably arose, these 
statutory means/ends structures were recurrently in need of elaboration and 
implementation.  It is the agencies, of course, that were delegated front-line 
decision-making powers, and their actions were to be upheld so long as they 
performed their statutory duties, kept within statutory bounds, and were not 
otherwise unlawful.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, so long as agencies acted 
pursuant to their enabling acts, their use of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
was regarded as a functional substitute for the interest-balancing mechanics of 
the legislative process. 
But there was reason to worry that agencies too often either failed to 
perform their statutory duties or acted beyond their statutory authorizations.  
Some of this suspicion was based on “capture” concerns, some on concern 
about undue influence from the White House and other “political” powers, and 
some on apprehension that an agency might be too single-mindedly focused on 
 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248–51 (2d Cir. 
1977) (remanding FDA safety regulations for smoked whitefish promulgated after notice and 
comment on grounds that FDA gave inadequate notice, failed to consider “all relevant factors,” 
and published an inadequate “statement of . . . basis and purpose”). 
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advancing some of its statutory goals at the expense of others.59  Regardless of 
the basis for the worry, however, adherents to the legal process school were 
generally of the view that, unless provided otherwise by statute, it was central 
to the power and professional responsibility of federal judges to ensure that 
administrative actors performed their statutory duties and kept within the limits 
and bounds of their enabling acts.60 
This general endorsement of non-deferential judicial review of agency 
interpretations of statutes was based on a particular understanding of what is 
involved in performing the task and on an assessment of the special 
competence of Article III judges—as much as it was based on worry about 
administrative over-reaching or non-performance of duty.  Although I can only 
summarize here, it is based on an understanding that statutory interpretation is 
at bottom an elaboration of ends/means structures, the skeletal outlines of 
which are already established by the statutes involved.61  Its proponents speak 
of “statutory construction,” and they have in mind the image of someone 
continuing to build on a structure that already exists.62 
Though not related physically, the parts of these structures are related 
functionally by way of means/ends connections.  The task of statutory 
 
 59. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 1084–88. 
 60. Section 706 of the APA provides that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret . . . statutory provisions, . . . [and] (2) hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).  However, there have 
long been two lines of authority on the question of how much deference a reviewing court should 
give to an agency’s interpretation of its enabling act.  In the 1960s and 1970s, it was commonly 
said that the court should defer to reasonable agency interpretations when it was clear that 
Congress intended that the agency (rather than the reviewing court) make law on the issue, but 
that the court, as “the final authority on issues of statutory construction,” should decide the matter 
without deference in all other instances.  See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 7:10, at 51–52 (2d ed. 1979) (distinguishing between “legislative rules” and 
“interpretative rules”).  As a matter of practice, however, the non-deferential stance appears to 
have been on the increase throughout this time.  Judge Leventhal expressed what seems to have 
been the prevailing sentiment when he wrote, “Congress has been willing to delegate its 
legislative powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation because there is court review 
to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits.”  Ethyl Corp. v. 
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  Empirical data on the measure of deference reviewing 
courts give to agency views is virtually impossible to generate, if for no other reason than that 
instances where agency decisions are upheld on review are ambiguous as between whether the 
agency is affirmed (1) because the reviewing court has deferred to its views or (2) because the 
reviewing court, though not deferring, agreed with the position taken by the agency. 
 61. For a classic exposition, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1949).  See also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
239 (1955) (espousing judicial oversight of agency interpretations using a “clear statutory 
purpose” test). 
 62. For a perspicuous account, see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958). 
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construction is not merely to ensure that actions taken under statutory authority 
are consistent, but to specify those actions that best advance the arrangement of 
means/ends relations that the statutory/regulatory structure has already been 
given.  The actor charged with interpreting a statute is understood to identify 
statutory ends or purposes, note their rank orders relative to one another, and 
elaborate the appropriate means for accomplishing those ends.  It is seen as a 
piece of what Congress and the President did in enacting the statute in the first 
place. 
What is more, the Article III judiciary was taken by adherents to this view 
to be especially suited to performing this task.  Their general jurisdiction and 
long experience was thought to have them especially adept at identifying ends 
and purposes and at analyzing means/ends connections.  Their life tenure and 
the sheer number of judges were thought to make it likely that the need for 
political independence could be met.  Moreover, their obligation to explain 
decisions in writing was held to be a safeguard for ensuring that it was 
statutory purposes, and not other things, that were elaborated. 
Any student of administrative law can identify many instances of federal 
judges non-deferentially rejecting important agency rules on statutory grounds 
in the late 1960s and the 1970s.63  Indeed, given that non-deferential judicial 
review of agency interpretations of regulatory statutes was the background 
understanding of the day, it might be claimed that it was statutory/regulatory/ 
judicially-fashioned structures that Congress and the President had in mind 
from the beginning.  But it is of the highest importance to recognize that 
judicial decisions rejecting agency actions on statutory grounds are often not 
the last word.  A judicial decision that prohibits an agency from doing what it 
wants to do or that requires it to do what it does not want to do can always be 
overturned by statutory amendment.  Indeed, insofar as the actions of an 
agency represent the views and priorities of the President, judicial rejection of 
the agency’s rule on statutory grounds should be seen as, at least in part, a 
structural decision, forcing the President to put the matter in controversy 
through the legislative process where the interests represented in both Houses 
of Congress, as well as those represented by the White House, can have their 
say.  Moreover, by conditioning the agency’s ability to accomplish White 
House objectives and policies on the consent of Congress, the courts will have 
conferred a measure of bargaining power on both Houses, enabling them to 
trade their approval of White House proposals for any number of compensating 
 
 63. W. Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 
1975) (construing the Forest Service’s Organic Act of 1897 to prohibit large scale clear cutting in 
national forests); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973) (construing the right-of-way provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act 
of 1920 in a way that prevented the Department of Interior to authorize construction of the Alaska 
Pipeline). 
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favors.64  Several obvious instances of just this kind of dynamic played a 
critical role in bringing about various rounds of statutory amendment in the 
1970s.65 
Additionally, it should not be overlooked that there was a much more 
prevalent and systematic way for Congress to exercise its influence and control 
over agency actions during the early decades of the rulemaking era.  Virtually 
every regulatory statute enacted during the 1960s and 1970s conditioned its 
delegation of rulemaking powers with some form of legislative veto.66  
Depending on the statute in question, legislative veto provisions created a 
window of time during which each House of Congress or both Houses acting 
by concurrent resolution or even a particular Committee of the Congress was 
able to reject an agency’s action.  Though the legislative veto dates back to the 
New Deal and earlier, it appears that the device was actually used to reject 
agency actions fairly infrequently.  But there is good reason to believe that its 
influence extended far beyond its actual use.  By empowering Congress to 
reject agency actions after they were taken, the legislative veto created a strong 
incentive for agencies to consult and negotiate with Congress before they 
acted.  Indeed, there is some evidence that a fair part of the agendas of many 
Congressional committee and subcommittee oversight hearings during the 
1970s and early 1980s were set in the shadow of the legislative veto.67 
Thus, while there was a fundamental turn toward rulemaking as the 
dominant form of federal administrative lawmaking in the late 1960s and 
1970s, it is fair to say that this enterprise was performed jointly by the agencies 
(and thus the White House in some measure), the courts, and Congress.  
Statutes delegated the power to promulgate rules in the first instance to the 
 
 64. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (modeling statutory interpretation as part of a 
sequential political game and presenting the results of a study concluding that almost half of the 
Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation decisions between 1975 and 1990 were made the 
specific focus of congressional override hearings). 
 65. For example, after the Supreme Court interpreted the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to 
prohibit the Tennessee Valley Authority from operating a $110 million dam in order to safeguard 
the protected snail darter, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 153 (1978), Congress amended the statute 
to establish an administrative mechanism (the “God Committee”) to consider exemptions from 
the Act’s prohibitions. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 
Stat. 3751 (1978). 
 66. By the early 1980s, nearly 300 statutes contained a legislative veto feature.  See INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 917, 944–45 (1983) (citing figures from James Abourezk, The Congressional 
Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. 
L. REV. 323, 324 (1977)). 
 67. See generally Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of 
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977) (finding 
that although Congress rarely used the legislative veto, agencies commonly negotiated and 
compromised with congressional committees “in the shadow” of the veto). 
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agencies, but the exercise of that power was subject to the checks of “hard 
look” review and nondeferential review of agencies’ statutory interpretations.  
Congress was kept in the loop through the amendment process when courts 
rejected agency rules on statutory grounds and more systematically when 
agencies consulted with Congressional actors about the prospect of legislative 
veto.  The agencies had the first, and usually the dominant, say in determining 
just what came out of the rulemaking process, but the courts and Congress 
were far more than bit players.  Though operating below the Constitutional 
level, administrative law was a genuine system of checks and balances.68 
This period of shared governance, as it turned out, was short-lived.  The 
reduction of judicial involvement began in the late 1970s with the Simon 
decision’s interjection of strict causation and redressability elements into 
standing doctrine69 and with Vermont Yankee Nuclear prohibiting lower courts 
from imposing extra-statutory procedural requirements as part of “hard look” 
review.70  While doctrinal changes were important, those decisions were 
especially noteworthy for the stance they took on the supervisory role of the 
lower courts.  The language of Justice Rehnquist in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
expressed the new tone: 
The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in 
the state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts 
under the guise of judicial review of agency action.  Time may prove wrong 
the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the States within 
their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that judgment.  In the 
meantime courts should perform their appointed function.71 
This new direction was taken further in the 1980s with a number of 
developments that weakened “hard look” review.  The most important of these 
was the Reagan Administration’s shift towards characterizing many more of its 
rules as “interpretative rules, statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice” or as rules for which there was “good 
cause” to proceed without notice and comment,72 and the concomitant 
 
 68. See Harold Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 66, 70 (1974) (describing the existing state of administrative law as acquiescing in broad 
delegations cabined by various controls on subsequent administrative actions). 
 69. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 26, 44–46 (1976) (holding an 
organization representing indigents to be without standing to challenge IRS Revenue Ruling 
reducing indigent services requirements for hospitals to qualify for IRC §501(c)(3) status). 
 70. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 544–45, 547–48 (1978). 
 71. Id. at 558. 
 72. See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 351 n.124 (1989) 
(finding that forty percent of the rules published during the first six months of 1987 in the 
Federal Register had been adopted without notice and comment). 
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readiness of the federal judiciary to acquiesce in that approach.73  Though 
seemingly innocuous, this move greatly reduced the utility of “hard look” 
review by depriving opponents of agency action the opportunity to build a 
record and by starving reviewing courts of ammunition that might be used to 
support a remand.  Other changes reinforced these developments.  The 
traditional ripeness doctrine was turned on its head in the 1980s, as more and 
more rules were protected from enforcement-stage review.74  Additionally, the 
development of negotiated rulemaking during this time effectively insulated 
such rules from serious challenge.75  In summary, “hard look” review had lost 
its status as a generally used method of demanding non-statutory oversight of 
agency rulemaking and had become a kind of template within which a 
reviewing court might or might not closely scrutinize the basis and rationale of 
agency action.76 
The most far-reaching change began in 1984, when along came Chevron.77  
The case arose out of a challenge to the Reagan Administration EPA’s 
promulgation of an important air pollution control regulation.  The rule, which 
replaced one that had been promulgated through notice-and-comment 
proceedings during the Carter administration, effectively exempted many 
existing sources of pollution in dirty air areas of the country from rigorous 
control requirements.78  It was rejected by a panel of the D. C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in an opinion that, giving little deference to the views of the Reagan 
 
 73. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agreeing with the 
Department of Health and Human Services that HHS rules concerning the organization of Peer 
Review Organizations, their activities, and their enforcement were either procedural in nature or 
policy statements and thereby exempt from APA § 553’s notice-and-comment requirements).  In 
the course of her opinion, Judge Wald explained how the courts had moved away from a 
“substantive impact” test to more relaxed standards when assessing agency choices of procedure.  
Id. at 1047–48. 
 74. For a summary of standards for enforcement stage review of rules that might have been 
reviewed immediately after promulgation, see NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191, 195–97 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 75. In 1990, Congress amended the APA to authorize agencies to promulgate rules through 
negotiated rulemaking. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2000).  
For a skeptical review of experience with negotiated rulemaking, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing 
Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997).  
For a defense of negotiated rulemaking, see Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual 
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000). 
 76. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) 
(upholding OSHA’s blood borne pathogens occupational exposure rule). 
 77. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 78. The rule, also issued after notice and comment, adopted what is known as “the bubble 
policy” for areas of the country that had been designated as not yet in attainment of the Clean Air 
Act’s national ambient air quality standards.  See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and 
Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 
Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). 
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EPA, set out just how the agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory 
language was incompatible with the ordering of purposes implicit in the 
structure of the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.79 
In rejecting the decision of the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court 
transformed judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes from an 
examination of statutory means and ends (“purposes”) into a search for the 
“meanings” of statutory words and phrases.  Writing for a six member court,80 
Justice Stevens set out the now well-known two step process: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise questions at issue, 
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would 
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.81 
Now, given that agencies rarely act in ways that are expressly prohibited by 
statute, the Chevron approach, when taken literally, is extraordinarily 
deferential; step one is to reject only those agency interpretations which are 
logically inconsistent with statutory requirements.  All other interpretations are 
to be upheld so long as they are “permissible.”82  Just as importantly, however, 
by reconceptualizing the problem from one of elaborating means-ends 
connections embedded in already existing statutory/regulatory structures into 
one of giving “meaning” to statutory language, Chevron establishes a 
systematically deferential stance to step one’s look for clear congressional 
intent.  Consider in this regard that nothing in Chevron explicitly bars the use 
of legislative history to determine whether Congress “directly addressed the 
precise questions at issue.”83  Nevertheless, most courts have refused to 
consider legislative history in step one of the analysis on the ground that resort 
to legislative history concedes that the statute is ambiguous and therefore 
 
 79. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726–28 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 80. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not take part in the decision. 
 81. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 82. The “permissible interpretation” standard of Chevron’s second step has been universally 
understood to be low.  See, e.g., Consumer Fed’n of Am. & Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1504–05 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (considering whether agency’s policy 
choice is arbitrary); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n 76 F.3d 400, 406–07 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (considering whether agency’s interpretation of statute is reasonable). 
 83. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
162 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:141 
implicates step two’s “permissible” interpretation inquiry.84  Indeed, by posing 
the statutory construction problem as one that ordinarily demands that an actor 
fashion a precise “meaning” for a vague or ambiguous word or phrase, 
Chevron painted proponents of non-deferential judicial review into the 
uncomfortable corner of judicial activism.85 
Although comparative data is extraordinarily difficult to generate, Chevron 
is reckoned to have generally reduced the federal judiciary’s ability to limit 
and control agency action.86  Its overall message to the courts cannot be better 
stated than it was by Justice Stevens in Chevron itself: 
  The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties’ briefs create 
the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum a specific 
policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency . . . . Judges are not 
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government.  Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political 
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.  In 
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress 
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by 
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.87 
 
 84. See, e.g., Arco Oil & Gas Co. v. EPA, 14 F.3d 1431, 1435–36 (10th Cir. 1993).  Justice 
Scalia has, of course, strongly criticized judicial use of legislative history, ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16–23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997), while Justice Breyer has encouraged its use, Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative 
History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992). 
 85. This conceptualization of statutory (and constitutional) construction/interpretation as a 
matter of giving “meanings” to words and phrases, with the corollary that the interpreter engages 
in unbridled lawmaking, is characteristic to twentieth century legal positivism.  For the influential 
account of H.L.A. Hart, distinguishing between the clear “core” meaning of words and their 
indeterminate “penumbra” and the treatment of judicial interpretation in the “penumbral area” as 
an exercise of discretion, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 606–15 (1958).  See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 121–32 
(1961). 
 86. One study examining nearly 2000 appellate decisions from 1984–85 and from 1988 
reported finding “strong evidence” of changed outcomes due to Chevron.  Peter H. Schuck & E. 
Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 984, 1036 (1990). 
 87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864, 865–66. 
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Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the influence of Chevron.  Its reach 
extends to every corner of administrative law.88  It has become the most cited 
Supreme Court decision of all time.89  It has given rise to scores of law review 
articles.  Insofar as legal change can be understood as a function of what it is 
that draws the attention of the “legal elites,”90 one would be hard put to find a 
more influential topic in all of contemporary public law.  It should be noted, 
however, that there is also a nondeferential version of Chevron, an 
understanding of the decision which invokes a footnote Justice Stevens 
appended to the first step of the new approach: 
  The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear 
congressional intent. . . . If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question 
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.91 
Indeed, many cases, especially over the last ten years, have used this non-
deferential gloss on step one to reject agency statutory interpretations.  The 
best-known instance in the health law area is Justice O’Connor’s Brown & 
Williamson opinion,92 which used the classical statutory means/ends analysis 
to reject the FDA’s child tobacco regulations as beyond the authority of the 
agency.  Moreover, in recent years the Court has muddied Chevron’s waters by 
intimating that the non-deferential stance is particularly apt where agency 
interpretations are made in the course of “opinion letters” or are contained in 
“policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which 
lack the force of law.”93  What is more, the lower courts have recognized a 
 
 88. Supreme Court opinions in the health law area making use of Chevron deference to 
uphold agency interpretations include Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980–84 
(1986) (upholding HHS aflatoxin regulations on Chevron deference because statute was 
“ambiguous”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184–87 (1991) (upholding HHS regulations 
reversing long-standing contrary policy because the statute was ambiguous on whether abortion 
counseling and referrals were proscribed and Chevron deference therefore was appropriate); 
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 500 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (upholding HHS Medicare 
reimbursement regulations because “where the agency’s interpretation of a statute is at least as 
plausible as competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to its construction”). 
 89. It has been reported that, as of December 2001, Chevron had been cited more than 7000 
times in federal decisions, more often than Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and 
Marbury v. Madison combined.  BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY 289 (5th ed. 2002). 
 90. See Claeys, supra note 3, at 111. 
 91. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases 
from the 1970s and earlier). 
 92. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). 
 93. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254 (2001). 
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number of “exceptions” to Chevron.94  While these developments often give 
reviewing courts the doctrinal bases to interject their own policy preferences,95 
nondeferential approaches to statutory review seem to remain but a minor 
theme.  And as illustrated best by some notoriously literalist opinions from 
Justice Scalia, nondeferential statutory review, when undertaken as a search for 
the “meaning” of statutory language, exposes the judge to charges of unbridled 
activism.96 
Now, an enormously important, though largely unheralded, indirect effect 
of deferential Chevron has been on the power of Congress.  Recall that in the 
Chevron case itself, the Court of Appeals struck down the Reagan 
Administration EPA’s rule on statutory grounds.  Had that been the end of the 
case, however, it is not at all clear that the White House would have been 
thwarted in its effort to reverse the Carter Administration’s air pollution 
control policy.  With policy change by rulemaking rejected, the White House 
would have been compelled to go to Congress for an amendment to the statute.  
Admittedly, with the House under Democratic control for all of the 1980s and 
the Senate for most of the decade, coming to an agreement on statutory 
changes might have been a formidable task.  But it would not have been 
impossible.  It is quite likely that the powers in the House and Senate would 
have been willing to give the Administration at least some of what it wanted in 
exchange for its agreeing to changes in other parts of the Clean Air Act or in 
some other area of policy that was important to the Democrats.  Indeed, as we 
have seen, it is in just this way that the non-deferential, “purposive” mode of 
reviewing agency interpretations of their enabling acts tended to create a 
legislative agenda for the White House, thereby establishing an ongoing ability 
in Congress to exercise some bargaining power.  But under deferential 
Chevron, this whole dynamic of give-and-take between the White House and 
the powers-that-be in Congress is short-circuited.  Statutes are inveterately 
vague and ambiguous, and the range of “permissible” interpretations is wide.  
Thus, agencies in the Reagan/Bush era were able to reverse and greatly modify 
Carter Administration policies without going to Congress, Clinton 
Administration agencies were able to drastically change earlier policies 
through rulemaking, and the Administration of George W. Bush has been able 
 
 94. See, e.g., Midland Coal Co. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 149 F.3d 558, 561 
(7th Cir. 1998) (finding Chevron deference not appropriate to questions of agency’s jurisdiction); 
Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941–42 (10th Cir. 1990) (giving no 
deference to agency interpretation of statute it does not administer, such as Freedom of 
Information Act). 
 95. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). 
 96. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–29 (1994) 
(writing such that Justice Scalia finds himself adjudicating among various dictionaries’ 
definitions of the word “modify”). 
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to reject and modify many Clinton policies without seeking statutory 
changes.97  Deferential Chevron obviously empowers the agencies.  But just as 
plainly, it simultaneously disables Congress by depriving it of the bargaining 
power it would have possessed were the White House forced to seek statutory 
amendment as the price to be paid for at least some of what it wants.98 
While deferential Chevron reduces the power of Congress by making it 
much easier for agencies to change policies without first obtaining 
amendments to their enabling acts, in its Chadha decision, issued a year before 
Chevron, the Supreme Court disabled Congress from using the legislative veto 
mechanism to control agency actions on a regulation-by-regulation basis.99  In 
an opinion setting out an extraordinarily formal understanding of “separation 
of powers” doctrine, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a bare majority, struck 
all forms of legislative veto as incompatible with the “bicameralism” and 
“presentment” clauses of Article I.100  As mentioned earlier, the utility of the 
legislative veto consisted not so much in the ex post rejection of agency 
decisions as in the bargaining power it gave to congressional committees and 
subcommittees to negotiate policies with federal agencies ex ante.  However, 
after Chadha, this bargaining power was gone.  With Congress disabled from 
rejecting particular administrative actions, agency officials have had little 
reason to consult or to negotiate with members of Congress in advance of their 
actions. 
One might speculate a bit about the institutional consequences of the loss 
of congressional bargaining power at the statutory level in the wake of 
 
 97. Compare Medicare Program; Participation in CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA, Hospital 
Admissions for Veterans, Discharge Rights Notice, and Hospital Responsibility for Emergency 
Care, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086 (June 22, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 489) (Clinton 
Administration’s regulation implementing EMTALA), with Medicare Program; Participation in 
CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA, Hospital Admissions for Veterans, Discharge Rights Notice, and 
Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,513 (June 16, 1988) (to be codified 
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 489, 1001, 1003) (less demanding Reagan Administration rule).  Compare 
Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating 
Hospitals in Treating Individuals With Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222 
(Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482, 489) (George W. Bush Administration 
regulation), with the Clinton rules, supra. 
 98. This second-order disabling effect on Congress is neglected by nearly all the 
commentators.  Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (criticizing Chevron for skewing the balance 
of power too far in the direction of the Executive Branch and arguing for placing interpretive 
power with the judiciary as a counterbalance but failing to note second-order effects on the power 
of Congress). 
 99. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 100. Id. at 946–59.  For discussion and criticism of the Supreme Court’s turn toward a 
formalist approach to “separation of powers” issues in the 1980s, see Peter L. Strauss, Formal 
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987). 
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Chevron and at the regulatory level with Chadha’s elimination of the 
legislative veto.  It is clear, for example, that it has become much more 
difficult to amend existing enabling acts.  Consider the long wait for the much 
needed 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act or the seemingly intractable 
impediments to changing the Endangered Species Act.101  Two decades of 
divided government, with one political party in the White House and the other 
in control of at least one House of Congress, has no doubt made it much more 
difficult to pass any legislation, but a background of divided government 
exacerbates the loss of congressional bargaining power that has been effected 
in the wake of deferential Chevron.  The existing Administration can simply 
change policy by regulation and so has no incentive to deal with a Congress 
that is controlled by the other party.102 
Of course, the one type of statute that cannot be avoided is the annual 
appropriations act that funds the various departments and other agencies of 
government, and here, it seems, we find the exception that proves the rule.  
With the President having no choice other than to deal, members of Congress 
not only routinely insert hundreds of riders having to do with narrow issues 
and problems that they cannot otherwise address, but Congress has come to use 
appropriations statutes to make major changes to existing enabling acts and 
even to establish entirely new statutory/regulatory regimes. 
Interestingly, this manner of effecting statutory change has been especially 
common in the health law area.103  Wrangling between Congress and the White 
House over the details of these appropriations statutes has been contentious 
and has often extended long into the oncoming fiscal year, yet in the end 
something is done, and the bargaining comes to some resolution.  But the same 
cannot be said for the work of the congressional committees and 
subcommittees that have lost bargaining power, at least in part, as a 
consequence of Chadha.  With the legislative veto risk removed, it appears that 
many agencies have found it unnecessary and not even worthwhile to consult 
(and certainly not to bargain) with congressional committees in control of the 
other political party prior to the issuance of rules.  Indeed, it seems that 
changes in regulatory policy are routinely dressed in a “principled” garb of 
partisan rhetoric, frustrating the party in control of Congress and stoking the 
fires of ill will.104  One might also ask whether these institutional changes have 
 
 101. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1888, Pub. L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 
(1988) (creating a recurrent focus of political conflict between the White House and the party that 
has controlled Congress for nearly a generation). 
 102. Again consider the expansion and then contraction of EMTALA obligations of hospitals 
with changes in administrations.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra notes 15, 17–18. 
 104. Consider once again the recurrent reversals of policy over funding of abortion 
counseling.  Consider also the George W. Bush Administration NIH’s withdrawal of Clinton 
Administration guidelines for research using stem cells derived from human embryos.  See 
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had much to do with what seems to be an increasing use of investigative 
hearings in Congress and on the rise of what has become known as “the 
politics of personal destruction.”105 
There is another part of the Chadha saga that should be noted.  As 
mentioned earlier, some 300 statutes contained legislative veto provisions by 
the time Chadha was decided.  Every one of those statutes delegated 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies.  In each instance, that lawmaking 
power was delegated with the understanding that its exercise would be subject 
to Congressional oversight by way of the veto mechanism.  Indeed, it may well 
be that many legislators were willing to grant lawmaking powers to agencies 
on the assumption that Congress retained the ability to check the exercise of 
such powers through the veto mechanism.106  Under Chadha, of course, all of 
the legislative veto provisions were voided.  However, with very few 
exceptions the delegations that the veto mechanisms were understood to 
condition were retained.  With a permissive gloss on the severability 
doctrine,107 the courts have held that the legislative veto provisions alone were 
to be struck.  The upshot of the whole scenario of course, is that the Chadha 
saga should be seen as the largest and most far-reaching delegation of 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies of the twentieth century. 
These developments respecting judicial and congressional review of 
agency lawmaking over the past two decades have in substantial measure 
disabled the judiciary and Congress from exercising the kind of influence and 
control that they previously enjoyed.  One might think that the upshot of all 
this would be that federal agencies have become more independent.  And one 
might even argue that insulating federal agencies would enable them to engage 
in better rulemaking—integrating and coordinating important social and 
economic policies without the intermeddling of unelected federal judges or 
from politically motivated actors in Congress and the White House.  But there 
has not been a change toward greater agency independence.  In fact, during the 
time that agencies have been insulated from judicial and Congressional control, 
 
National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 105. See, e.g., Stephen Moore & Jeffrey Bell, The Left’s Nightmare, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
2004, at A21; Don Van Natta Jr., Raising Funds: Impeachment is Powerful Tool, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20, 1999, at A1. 
 106. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 594 F. Supp. 92, 95 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d, 
766 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1985), judgment aff’d sub nom.  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678, 697 (1987) (concluding that Congress delegated certain powers to the CAB with the 
understanding firmly in mind that regulations issued by the Secretary would be subject to 
legislative veto). 
 107. See Brock, 480 U.S. at 685 (reversing the district court’s decision after concluding that 
“the statute [would] function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress” with the 
legislative veto provision alone excised). 
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there has been an enormous increase in influence and control from the White 
House. 
Though modern White House influence on agency rulemaking had its 
beginnings with the Nixon, Carter, and Ford Administrations,108 it was 
strengthened into what can only be called total White House control during the 
Reagan and Clinton years.109  During his first month in office, President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which directed all executive agencies 
to prepare and consider a “Regulatory Impact Analysis” (RIA) and to submit 
the RIA for review to what later became OMB’s Office of Information and 
Regulatory Review (OIRA), before publishing the notice that it was proposing 
to promulgate a major rule.110  The RIA was to include a description of the 
potential benefits and costs of the rule, a determination of the potential net 
benefits of the rule, and a description of any alternatives to achieving the 
regulatory goal at lower cost with an analysis of potential benefits and costs 
and an explanation of the legal reasons why such alternatives could not be 
adopted.111  Additionally, the executive order directed agencies, “to the extent 
permitted by law,” to regulate only if benefits exceeded costs and, even then, 
to choose the regulatory alternative that “involve[ed] the least net cost to 
society.”112  The policy orientation of Reagan era regulatory review becomes 
clear in the guidance that David Stockman’s OMB gave to the agencies, 
directing them to identify market failures that gave rise to the need for 
regulation and to explain how the regulation corrects them, to quantify all costs 
and benefits using willingness-to-pay methodologies when necessary, and to 
reduce all aggregate costs and benefits to present value using a discount rate as 
high as ten percent.113  The deregulatory effect of the effort is obvious when 
 
 108. President Nixon created a “Quality of Life” office to review regulatory programs.  
President Ford required agencies to issue Inflation Impact Statements of their actions, with OMB 
oversight.  President Carter imposed the first comprehensive regulatory analysis requirement and 
established a Regulatory Analysis Review Group in the White House to review agency rules 
having a significant economic impact.  See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 965 (1997); Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991); Christopher C. 
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1075 (1986). 
 109. It should be kept in mind throughout this brief summary that, while not expressly 
excluded from the APA § 551(1) definition of “agency,” the President has been held not to be an 
agency under the APA and so not subject to its many procedural requirements and APA based 
judicial review. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).  See also Jonathan R. 
Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612 (1997). 
 110. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 13,193–94. 
 113. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 114 (3d ed. 1992) (citing OMB, 
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one observes that government programs commonly involve readily 
quantifiable costs primarily at the front end (and so are only modestly 
discounted even with the high discount rate), whereas benefits are often diffuse 
and soft (and so are not easily quantified) and may extend far into the future 
(and so are reckoned with the ten percent per year discount rate at very low 
present values).  Consider the implications of the analysis on, for example, 
government subsidized student loan programs, Medicaid benefits, or neo-natal 
care initiatives.114 
Additionally, during his second term, President Reagan issued an executive 
order that established a formal mechanism for regulatory planning, again under 
the oversight of the OMB.115  Each agency was required to annually submit to 
the OMB “a statement of its regulatory policies, goals and objectives for the 
coming year and information concerning all significant regulatory actions 
underway or planned.”116  The Director of OMB was to review the agency’s 
program to ensure that all regulatory actions would be “consistent with the 
goals of the agency and of the Administration” and “to take such actions as 
may be necessary” to carry out the policies of the Administration “to the extent 
permitted by law.”117  Like the executive order establishing regulatory impact 
analysis and OMB review, this second directive declared that actions taken 
pursuant to its requirements were “intended only to improve the internal 
management of the Federal government,” did not create any enforceable rights 
or benefits, and were not subject to judicial review.118 
Early in his first term, President Clinton issued his own executive order,119 
replacing the two issued by Reagan, greatly modifying both the policy 
 
REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, April 1, 1988–March 31, 1989, 
at 32–37). 
 114. Summarizing the effect of the executive order during the Reagan years, one well 
informed observer notes: 
During Reagan’s tenure, roughly eighty-five rules each year were either returned to the 
agencies for reconsideration or withdrawn by the agencies in the course of review.  
Although this figure amounted to less than four percent of all rules OMB reviewed, the 
rules that provoked OMB’s displeasure tended to be among the most important.  In 1986, 
responding to questions from Democrats in Congress, the OMB director could cite only 
six instances in which agencies had issued rules over OMB’s objections: in four, the 
agencies had acted under judicial order, and in two, the agencies successfully had 
appealed their position to the White House. 
Kagan, supra note 108, at 2278–79. 
 115. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036, 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985). 
 116. Id. at 1036. 
 117. Id. at 1036, 1038. 
 118. Id. at 1038. 
 119. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 app. at 557–61 
(formally rescinding Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,496). 
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orientation and structure of the earlier programs.120  The Clinton 
Administration rejected the earlier single-minded emphasis on market failure, 
focusing more broadly on “compelling public need, such as material failures of 
private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the 
environment, or the well-being of the American people” as the predicate for 
regulation.121  Though directing agencies to quantify costs and benefits “to the 
extent feasible,”122 the Clinton order also required them to identify and 
consider “qualitative” costs and benefits, including “distributional impacts” 
and “equity,” enhancement of health and safety, the protection of the natural 
environment, the reduction of discrimination and bias, and effects on state, 
local and tribal governmental programs and activities.123  In contrast to Reagan 
era secrecy, the Clinton executive order required agencies to disclose RIA 
information after the issuance of their rules and to identify substantive changes 
between the drafts submitted for OIRA review and the decisions subsequently 
adopted.124  Moreover, the Clinton order prohibited all oral communications 
between any person not employed in the executive branch and any OIRA 
employee other than its Administrator, and it established a system for 
disclosing written ex parte communications with OIRA.125  As to the decision-
making structure, the Clinton approach reoriented OIRA toward the 
performance of clearinghouse and coordination functions, created a new entity, 
the Regulatory Working Group (chaired by the Administrator of OIRA and 
consisting of representatives of agencies with significant regulatory 
responsibilities, the Vice President, and the President’s domestic policy 
advisors) to perform the critical oversight tasks,126 and gave the Vice President 
important responsibilities in resolving disagreements and conflicts between 
agencies or between OMB and an agency.127  It should also be mentioned that 
the Clinton executive order required independent agencies, as well as 
traditional executive officials, to submit annual regulatory plans, and it created 
a substantial role for the Vice President in the planning process.128 
Interestingly, the Clinton executive order limited its regulatory analysis 
requirements to rules “which the agency intends to have the force and effect of 
law,” thereby exempting interpretive rules, policy statements, and rules of 
 
 120. President George H.W. Bush retained both Reagan executive orders, though he 
established a new body within the White House, the Council on Competitiveness, chaired by the 
Vice President, to oversee the work of OIRA. 
 121. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 119, at 638–39. 
 122. Id. at 645. 
 123. Id. at 638. 
 124. Id. at 647. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 119, at 643. 
 127. Id. at 647. 
 128. Id. at 642–43. 
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agency procedure, organization and practice.129  To some extent, this may have 
created another incentive for agencies to avoid the notice and comment 
process.130  However, all significant agency actions were covered by the 
executive order’s regulatory planning process, and the Clinton Administration 
developed several additional ways to influence and control agency actions.  
The most important was the use of formal directives, typically issued as 
memoranda to high officials, instructing them to issue a rule or to engage in 
some other type of agency action.131  By issuing these directives, the Clinton 
White House was able to take the initiative in setting and implementing the 
Administration’s regulatory agenda rather than merely reacting to actions 
proposed by the agencies.  President Clinton made increasing use of these 
memoranda to direct and control agency action, not least on matters at the very 
center of health law.132  Additionally, and famously, President Clinton 
developed the practice of personally and publicly presenting the work product 
and activities of agencies as accomplishments specifically of his 
 
 129. Id. at 641. 
 130. By the 1990s, notice-and-comment rulemaking was widely criticized as demanding, 
burdensome, and expensive.  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995).  More recently, however, the “ossification” thesis has 
been challenged. See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals 
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000). 
 131. See Kagan, supra note 108, at 2294–95 (noting that Clinton issued 107 such directives 
during his eight years in office, compared to a total of nine during the Reagan years and four 
during the George H.W. Bush term). 
 132. See Kagan, supra note 108, at 2303-05.  In 1998, Clinton issued a memorandum 
ordering agency officials with responsibility for health-care programs to report to him on the 
extent to which their actions complied with a model “patients’ bill of rights” that one of his 
advisory commissions had developed. Id. at 2303.  The memorandum also contained 
an order to the Secretary of Labor to propose regulations requiring health plans regulated 
under ERISA to meet strengthened standards regarding internal appeals of decisions to 
deny benefits; an order to the Administrator of the Office of Personnel Management, in 
her management of federal employees’ health plans, to contract only with insurance 
carriers that agreed to comply with the model bill of rights and to propose regulations to 
ensure enforcement of one of the bill’s provisions; and orders to the Secretaries of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), Veterans Affairs, and Defense to issue specified policy 
directives, notifications to relevant state officials, and other “appropriate administrative 
actions” to bring into compliance Medicare, Medicaid, and the veterans’ and military 
health systems. 
Id. at 2303–04.  Kagan also mentions other directives on health care issued during President 
Clinton’s second term, including one ordering HHS to revise the Medicare program to cover costs 
of clinical trials of new drugs and medical treatments, another directing various agencies to 
promote the enrollment of children in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 
and still another requiring agencies to develop ways to track medical errors and reduce errors 
associated with misuse of medications and medical devices.  Id. at 2304–05. 
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Administration,133 and this public “appropriation” of policy by the White 
House is said to have had “a substantive pull on administration decision 
making”134 by inducing multifarious efforts to generate the kind of agency 
actions that the President could later tout.135  Two striking illustrations of this 
“presidential appropriation” of policy in the health-care area are President 
Clinton’s August 10, 1995, press conference announcement of the FDA’s 
proposed regulations to reduce youth smoking and his May 23, 1999, 
announcement that he had directed the Secretary of Labor to issue a rule 
allowing States to offer paid leave to the parents of newborns through the 
unemployment insurance system.136 
President George W. Bush has not revoked the Clinton Administration’s 
regulatory review and planning executive order.  However, in February 2002, 
he issued an executive order that amended the Clinton order primarily by 
replacing the Vice President with the Chief of Staff to the President in the 
formal regulation review structure and by routing conflict resolutions directly 
to the President. 137  Given the extraordinary secrecy of the Bush White House 
regarding internal decisions, especially after September 11, it is difficult to 
know the details of the actual process. 138  However, the Bush Administration 
appears to have made extensive use of the Clinton order’s exemption of 
interpretive rules, policy statements, and rules of agency organization, 
procedure and practice from the OIRA process.139  It also appears to have 
sidestepped the review process when it determines that a new rule decreases 
rather than increases regulatory burdens.140  At the same time, the Bush White 
House seems to have increased the role of the President’s domestic policy 
 
 133. Id. at 2299–302. 
 134. Id. at 2301. 
 135. Id. at 2299–302.  See also Strauss, supra note 108, at 965–68. 
 136. Kagan, supra note 108, at 2282–83. 
 137. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385, 9385–86 (Feb. 28, 2002). 
 138. This is highlighted by extended litigation between the Vice President and environmental 
groups over disclosure of membership in and activities of the National Energy Policy 
Development Group (NEPDG), culminating in Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 
2576 (2004) (deciding that the Court of Appeals should have considered separation of powers 
arguments when considering whether to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court to exempt 
the Vice President and other members of NEPDG from procedural and disclosure requirements of 
Federal Advisory Committee Act). 
 139. See, e.g., Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding HHS rules giving 
criteria to contractors for denial of payment for health services based on local coverage 
determinations to be “interpretive” rather than “substantive”); Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. 
Thompson, 373 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2004) (validating HHS “interpretive rule” allowing ALJ to 
grant summary judgment without an in-person hearing in proceeding against skilled nursing 
facility for failing to provide patient care). 
 140. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of 
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 
Fed. Reg. 53,222 (Sept. 9, 2003) (the Bush EMTALA rule). 
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advisors and to have made extensive use of the innovations for control of 
agency action pioneered by President Clinton.141  The present situation was 
perhaps best expressed during a speech by the General Counsel to HHS in 
March 2004, when he acknowledged that the Department could not get a word 
published in the Federal Register without White House approval.142 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I have tried to make two basic observations about connections between 
health law and administrative law.  First, I have noted that it is by virtue of the 
creation of statutory/regulatory structures where the operative law is fashioned 
primarily through rulemaking that health law has come into existence (and has 
changed and developed) as a distinguishable, reasonably coherent body of law 
and policy.  Second, I have noted that over the past quarter century federal 
rulemaking has been substantially insulated from the influence and oversight 
of the federal judiciary and of Congress, while at the same time it has been 
increasingly put under the power and control of the White House.  Now, each 
of these observations is interesting and noteworthy.  But the really important 
development, in my view, has to do with the combination of the two, for if the 
content and form of health law is largely a function of federal rulemaking, and 
if federal rulemaking is largely in the control of the White House, then the 
present and future of health law and policy is situated right at the center of 
presidential politics. 
There are many who applaud these developments.  There is a school of 
constitutional law scholars who argue for strong presidential control of all 
agency lawmaking on originalist grounds and out of a strict separation-of-
powers ideology.143  Others endorse White House direction of agency 
rulemaking on accountability and efficiency considerations.  They point out 
that many of the measures taken to increase White House control, such as the 
 
 141. For example, the Bush Administration NIH’s withdrawal of the Clinton guidelines for 
research using stem cells derived from human embryos explains its actions as predicated on the 
President’s decision to limit federal funding for research using only existing embryonic stem cell 
lines.  National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem 
Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107, 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001).  See also The White House, Fact Sheet: 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001) (summarizing the President’s directive on stem 
cell research), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/print/20010809-1.html. 
 142. Alex M. Azar II, Administrative Law Meets Health Law: Inextricable Pairing or 
Marriage of Convenience?, Keynote Address at the Saint Louis University Health Law 
Symposium (Mar. 26, 2004), in 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 35 (2005). 
 143. For a sampling of the scholarship generated by the work of these so-called “unitarians,” 
some of whom argue for the unconstitutionality of the “independent agencies,” see Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 
541 (1994); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 (1994). 
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use of RIA’s and regulatory agendas and the President’s readiness to take 
personal credit for regulatory initiatives, increase the transparency of 
rulemaking, enabling the public to better understand both issues and players.  
They then contend that, given the President’s national electoral constituency, 
the White House is induced to tailor regulatory actions in ways that respond to 
whatever mandate might be inferred from the last election and that expand the 
President’s base of public support for the next election.  Moreover, proponents 
of presidential control extol the White House’s ability to cost-effectively 
coordinate regulatory actions, to impose “a coherent regulatory philosophy 
across a range of fields to produce novel regulatory (or for that matter, 
deregulatory) policies,” and to effect “a certain kind of dynamism or energy in 
administration” that overcomes bureaucratic inertia.144  Indeed, some 
proponents of presidential control would reject judicial use of “hard look” 
review of rules,145 which are shown to have been fashioned with active 
presidential influence, and they lament the development of doctrines that 
enable judges to refuse Chevron deference to rules issued with substantial 
White House involvement.146 
Now, these arguments based on accountability and efficiency 
considerations are not without their weaknesses.  Claims that the White House 
is accountable to the general electorate for its regulatory output might be 
dismissed as so much wishful thinking.  Even proponents of presidential 
control acknowledge that connections between the substance of regulation and 
those who influence its adoption are as transparent as the occupants of the 
White House care to have them.147  And given the generality and the opacity of 
the typical presidential election campaign, it is quite a reach to assert that the 
critical details of particular regulatory initiatives enjoy the endorsement of any 
past or future electorate.  Moreover, the purported efficiency advantages of 
White House control of regulatory actions might just as easily be taken to be 
vices.  In the first place, some activities—the operation of nuclear power 
plants, for example, or the development, manufacture and distribution of 
prescription medications—are best performed from within relatively stable 
rules of the game that are fashioned and implemented with a fairly single-
minded focus rather than coordinated and integrated into a politicized and 
constantly changing regulatory agenda.  Secondly, White House adherence to a 
“coherent regulatory philosophy” can take the form of a top-down imposition 
of a rigid and dangerous ideology that suppresses statutory goals as easily as it 
 
 144. Kagan, supra note 108, at 2339, 2341.  For an extended argument endorsing White 
House control along these lines, see id. at 2331–46. 
 145. Id. at 2380–83. 
 146. See id. at 2372–80. 
 147. See id. at 2316 (contrasting Clinton and Reagan approaches, noting that the Clinton 
White House “in large part functioned in public view,” while the Reagan administration operated 
“in private”). 
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can constitute a rational setting of priorities among national problems.  Lastly, 
the “bureaucratic inertia” overcome by the “dynamism” of White House 
control might manifest, not a lack of imagination or of energy or even of 
resolve, but the considered judgment of seasoned public servants who, at least 
as to some matters, have it right.  There is, of course, an extremely cynical 
view of White House control.  It sees the existing arrangement as designed for 
the powerful and the moneyed.  On this view, big pharmaceutical and large 
public hospital corporations and ATLA and the AARP work their deals with 
the presidential candidates (or their staffs) and then get on with the selling of 
their candidate, manipulating the electorate in any way they can, and when 
their candidate wins, they win.  But one might also advance a far more 
measured response to the concentration of regulatory power in the White 
House.  It would acknowledge the importance of setting priorities and the need 
for policy coordination, and it would see the Presidency as playing the leading 
role.  Yet it would also acknowledge the dangers and risks of exclusive White 
House control, regretting the past quarter century’s loss of checks and 
balances.148  And in this latter regard, it would press for institutional change, 
most concretely for ways to reintroduce the influence and responsibility of 
Congress, but more generally for a return to an understanding of 
statutory/regulatory structures as jointly fashioned means for advancing what 
are often complex social ends. 
 
 148. For such a criticism of the development of White House control, see Strauss, supra note 
108. 
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